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Abstract 
The paper provides an empirical study of the redistributive effects of agricultural policy in 
Tuscany which finds that the provision of support increased absolute income inequality 
within the agricultural community because the distribution of transfers was both vertically 
and horizontally inequitable.  These conclusions are shown to hold whether or not non-farm 
incomes are taken into account and for a range of alternative definitions of the agricultural 
community.  The results for Scotland are broadly comparable except that the distribution of 
transfers was progressive not regressive, reflecting differences between the two regions in the 
degree of dependency of agriculture on support. 
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1. Introduction 
The improvement of the income position of the agricultural community is a prominent if 
poorly defined objective of agricultural policy in many countries.  In particular, one of the 
main objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is ‘to ensure a fair standard of 
living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of 
persons engaged in agriculture’ (European Union, 2002, Article 33).  However there has been 
relatively little empirical work to characterise and quantify the effects of farm support 
programmes on the distribution of income within the agricultural community.  One set of 
studies (see e.g. Roberts and Russell, 1996; Rocchi et al. 2005; Cavalletti and Rocchi, 2006) 
has examined the distributional effects of agricultural policy using macroeconomic models in 
which the agricultural household sector is disaggregated by total household income class.  In 
particular, Rocchi et al. (2005) present a SAM-based model for Italy which shows inter alia 
that agricultural households in higher total income classes receive a larger share of the total 
value of CAP support accruing to the sector.  A second line of work (see e.g. Keeney, 2000; 
OECD, 2003; Allanson, 2006a, 2006b) has sought to explore the issues using farm business 
survey data.  The use of micro-level data allows a more detailed characterisation of the 
redistributive properties of agricultural policy, but limitations in farm business survey 
coverage and content have typically restricted the scope of such studies to the commercial 
farm sector and the analysis to measures of farming income.  Thus Allanson (2006a, 2006b) 
is only able to establish that agricultural support would have had an equalizing effect on the 
distribution of farming income across full-time farms in Scotland but for the adverse 
distributional consequences of horizontal inequities induced by farm support measures.  What 
remains to be shown is whether these estimates of the redistributive effects of the CAP are 
specific to the empirical setting or might hold more generally for broader measures of 
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income, more inclusive definitions of the agricultural community and other regions of the 
European Union. 
The main contribution of this paper is to report the results of a microeconomic study of 
the redistributive effects of agricultural support in Tuscany that serves to throw light on all 
three of these issues.  First, the study offers a broader analysis of the impact of farm income 
support on the economic welfare of the farming community by taking into account both farm 
and non-farm sources of income.  Farm households that are entirely dependent on agricultural 
production for their livelihoods are a minority, with most also relying on some combination 
of income from other gainful activities, pensions, social security and other payments to a 
greater or lesser extent (Eurostat, 1996).  Yet the design of agricultural policy almost entirely 
fails to take the overall income situation of farm households into account.  Second the study 
explores the implications of using less restrictive definitions of the agricultural community 
than the commercial farms sector.  In particular, the paper provides additional results based 
on both “broad” and “narrow” definitions of the agricultural household sector, where the 
former covers all households which derive some income from agriculture while the latter is 
limited to those for which farming is the main source of income.  Finally, the paper provides 
a comparative study which can serve to establish whether the results obtained for Scotland 
are peculiar to that country or might be more generally characteristic of the effects of the 
CAP.  The choice of Tuscany for this purpose is likely to highlight any variability in the 
distributional consequences of the CAP across the European Union given the marked 
differences in both output mix and farm structures between the UK and Italy.  Conversely, 
the identification of common features would help to establish the generality of any 
conclusions regarding the redistributive effects of the CAP.   
The paper is organised as follows.  The next section briefly summarizes the measures 
that are used to characterise and quantify the redistributive effects of agricultural policy.  The 
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third section describes the population-weighted micro-level data employed in the analysis, 
which are derived from the Italian Agricultural Business Survey (REA) for 2002 and, for 
comparative purposes, the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) for 2002/03.  The following 
section presents the main findings of the study on the redistributive effects of agricultural 
support in Tuscany, comparing the results from using alternative definitions of income and 
the agricultural community, and those obtained for Scotland.  The final section offers a 
summary and considers the need for further research into the redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy across the whole of society not just the agricultural community.  
 
 
2. Measurement of the redistributive effects of agricultural policy 
The study is based on the methodology proposed in Allanson (2006b) to measure the 
redistributive effects of agricultural policy due to the transfers accruing to farmers from the 
provision of support.  In this approach, the overall redistributive effect is defined as the 
difference between the inequality of pre-transfer and post-transfer farm incomes.  
Specifically, R=AX-AY  is defined as an index of the overall redistributive effect, where AX  
and AY  are the absolute Gini indices of pre-transfer and post-transfer incomes respectively.  
Hence, R  will be equal to half the change in the average absolute difference between all 
distinct pairs of incomes in the population as a result of the provision of support.  
Alternatively, if the policy evaluation function is given by the Sen (1973) welfare index 
W= Ay − , where y  is average income, then R may be interpreted as how much more or less 
would have to be given to each farmer under a distributionally neutral policy of flat-rate 
payments to yield a welfare level equal to that under the actual support programme. 
 
2.1 Decomposition of the overall redistributive effect  
The index R is decomposed to provide an explicit characterisation of the redistributive 
properties of farm income support measures.  The first step in the procedure identifies 
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horizontal inequities due to the violation of the ‘classical’ principle of the equal treatment of 
pre-transfer income equals.  Such violations may arise due to systematic differences in the 
organization and level of support for different commodities, such that the level of transfers 
received by farmers with identical pre-transfer incomes depends upon the type of farm in 
terms of the choice of enterprise mix.  Moreover, even after controlling for both pre-transfer 
income and farm type, the incidence of transfers may still vary due to the heterogeneity of 
individual farms in terms of natural resource endowments, managerial ability and historical 
development.   
The key to this step is the specification of a set of ‘reference’ functions that determine 
the post-transfer incomes that farmers with a given level of pre-transfer income would 
receive in the absence of each of the two possible sources of classical horizontal inequity 
(HI).  Consider a population of N farms made up of an exhaustive set of K mutually exclusive 
farm types (k = 1,... K).  Let x=(x1,… xk,… xK), t=(t1,… tk,… tK) and y=(y1,… yk,… yK) be 
the vectors of observations on pre-transfer income, transfers and post-transfer incomes 
respectively, where xk, tk, and yk are constituent sub-vectors of observations on farms of type 
k.  By definition, y=x+t .  Moreover the relationship between transfers and pre-transfer 
incomes can be written as:  
tk  =  E[tk| xk] + εk  =  fk(xk) + εk;               k = 1,….K    (1) 
where the farm type transfer function fk(xk) is defined as the expected value of transfers 
conditional upon type and pre-transfer income; and εk is a vector of ‘disturbance’ terms 
having zero mean at each pre-transfer income level.   
The characterisation of transfers given by (1) allows for two possible sources of classical 
HI.  First classical HI may arise between farms of the same type due to the dispersion of 
transfers tk about the conditional mean E[tk| xk].  Accordingly, the non-stochastic reference 
function hW(x)=(g1(x1),…gk(xk),…gK(xK)), where gk(xk)=xk+ fk(xk), is identified as the vector 
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of post-transfer incomes that the population of farms would receive in the absence of within 
type HI.  Let AW be the absolute Gini index of hW(x) then within type HI is measured as the 
difference in inequality between hW(x) and y, that is HW=AW–AY, which will be 
asymptotically non-positive though this condition may not hold in any particular finite 
sample drawn from the population.  Only if εk=0, and hence y=hW(x), will there be a one-to-
one mapping from pre-transfer to post-transfer incomes for type k farms and hence no within 
type HI.   
Classical HI may also arise due to systematic discrimination between farm types, which 
is assumed to change the distribution but not the overall value of transfers at any given pre-
transfer income.  Accordingly, the non-discriminatory reference function hB(x)=E[y| x] may 
be identified as the vector of post-transfer incomes that the population of farms would expect 
to receive in the absence of discrimination, where: 
hB(x)  =  ∑
=
K
k 1
 wk(x) gk(x) =  x + ∑
=
K
k 1
 wk(x) fk(x) ≡  x + fB(x);        ∑
=
K
k 1
 wk(x) = 1; (2) 
the weights wk(x) are locally determined by the relative frequencies of the farm types at any 
given pre-transfer income, fB(x) is identified as the non-discriminatory transfer function, and 
1 is the unit vector.  Let AB be the absolute Gini index of hB(x) then between type HI is 
measured as the difference in inequality between hB(x) and hW(x), that is HB=AB–AW, which 
again will be non-positive asymptotically but may not be so in finite samples. Only if 
fk(xk)=f(xk) ∀k, and hence hW(x)=hB(x), will there be a one-to-one mapping from pre-transfer 
incomes to expected post-transfer incomes for all farms and hence no between type HI.   
The identification of the classical HI contributions to the overall redistributive effect R, 
leaves a residual equal to the difference in inequality between pre-transfer and non-
discriminatory post-transfer incomes, AX-AB .  The final step in the decomposition procedure 
decomposes this residual into separate horizontal and vertical components:  
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VHCyGxGCyAA RBBXBBBBX +=−+−=− ][][  (3) 
where GX  and GB  are the (ordinary) Gini coefficients of pre-transfer and non-discriminatory 
post-transfer income, x  and  By  are the corresponding mean incomes, and CB  is the 
concentration index obtained when non-discriminatory post-transfer incomes are ranked by 
pre-transfer income.   
The horizontal inequity component HR  = ][ BBB GCy −  in (3) measures the redistributive 
effect of systematic changes in the ranking of farms between the pre-transfer and non-
discriminatory post-transfer income distributions, where [CB  – GB] is the reranking index of 
Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981).  HR  is non-positive by definition, capturing the idea 
that systematic reranking is a manifestation of procedural unfairness in the provision of 
support.  Only if hB(x) is increasing in x over the whole range of pre-transfer incomes will 
there be no systematic reranking of farms.   
Finally the vertical equity component V = [ BBX CyGx − ] =- CTB Bt  measures the impact 
of differences in non-discriminatory policy transfers between farms with different pre-
transfer incomes, which may be interpreted as an index of gross redistributive effect.  This in 
turn depends on the distribution and scale of policy transfers, where CTB  is the concentration 
coefficient of non-discriminatory transfers ranked by pre-transfer income and Bt  is the mean 
level of non-discriminatory transfers.  Let D=-CTB  be a disparity index that is positive 
(negative) if support is progressive (regressive) in absolute terms such that mean non-
discriminatory transfers are a decreasing (increasing) function of pre-transfer income, and 
that equals zero if the transfer schedule is uniform.  For any given D, V will be proportional 
to the average level of non-discriminatory transfers Bt .  In general, V will be more positive 
(or less negative) than R due to the various sources of HI that detract from the redistributive 
effectiveness of policy.   
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2.2 Reference function estimation  
The reference functions hW(x) and hB(x) may be directly estimated as in Allanson (2006b), 
but an indirect approach based on the estimation of the transfer functions is preferable 
inasmuch as this yields more meaningful regression summary statistics.  Accordingly, the set 
of farm type transfer functions fk(xk) in (1) is estimated from a sample consisting of nk 
observations on transfers and pre-transfer incomes for each farm type.  The choice of a 
suitable non-parametric technique for the purpose gets round the need to impose any 
parametric assumptions on the form of the fk(xk) functions.  In this study, the variable span 
smoother of Sasieni (1998) is used to fit a local linear regression to the observations on tk and 
xk in the neighbourhood of each data point in the sample.  The same local regression 
technique is also applied to the pooled sample of n=∑nk observations in order to directly 
estimate the non-discriminatory transfer function fB(x) in (2).   
Local linear regression may be expected to provide reasonable approximations to fk(xk) 
and fB(x) so long as the curvature of the unknown functions is not excessive (Hastie and 
Loader, 1993).  Moreover, the procedure ensures that the predicted level of non-
discriminatory transfers at any given pre-transfer income will automatically reflect the farm 
type composition of the pooled sample in the neighbourhood of that point.   
 
 
3. Data sources and derivation of variables 
Calculation of the redistributive effect measures requires access to individual farm data on 
pre-transfer and post-transfer incomes.  The empirical study is based on weighted micro-level 
data from the Italian Agricultural Business Survey (REA) for Tuscany in 2002 and the 
Scottish Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) for the farming year 2003/2003.  The two surveys 
form the main source of microeconomic data on farm businesses in their respective countries, 
with sub-samples from each forming part of the European Union’s Farm Accountancy Data 
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Network (FADN).  Nevertheless there are significant differences between the surveys in 
terms of coverage and content, which constrain the common definition and derivation of 
variables used in the study.  
 
3.1 Italian data1  
The Italian Farm Business Survey (REA) has been carried out annually since 1999 by the 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, 2005). The main goal of the survey is to provide 
microeconomic information compatible with the new European System of National Accounts 
(ESA95) with reference to the agricultural sector.  Accordingly the REA sample is designed 
to represent the universe of agricultural holdings, with farms chosen to be representative of 
their economic size and type at the regional level where the economic size of businesses is 
measured in terms of standard gross margins and the farm type classification is based on the 
relative importance of the various crop and livestock enterprises.  The inclusion in the 
observation field of all holdings makes the survey representative of the totality of agricultural 
households, whatever the importance of farming as a source of income. 
The REA sample for Tuscany in 2002 consisted of 643 farms, of which 569 were 
operated by households.  Data are available on a sufficient range of financial variables to 
identify farming income but the underlying physical quantities are not generally recorded in 
the database.  Complete data on hours and remuneration, both on and off the farm, are also 
available for each economically active farm household member and for any other partners 
and directors who are actively engaged in the farm.  This allows for an estimation of the total 
income of farming households and an assessment of their relative position within the income 
                                                 
1  Access to the Italian data was authorised as part of the research project on “The use of 
microeconomic information for the analysis of income distribution in Tuscan 
Agriculture” funded by the Regional Government of Tuscany and carried out by the 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics of the University of Florence. 
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distribution of the society.  The data is weighted by size and type according to the number of 
holdings enumerated in the 5th General Agricultural Census 2000, to yield summary statistics 
for the population of agricultural holdings.  With 83459 farms in the sampling frame, the 
sampling fraction for each size and type is 0.77 per cent on average. 
 
3.2 Scottish data  
The FAS is an annual survey of farm businesses carried out on behalf of the Scottish 
Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD).  It is designed as a survey 
of full-time commercial businesses representing the main farm types in Scotland.  The field 
of observation therefore excludes farms smaller than 8 Economic Size Units (ESUs) as well 
as specialist livestock units larger than 200 ESU and certain minor farm types (most notably 
horticulture and specialist pigs and poultry farms).  Farms in the survey are chosen to be 
representative of their economic size and type, but part-time farmers and those with 
substantial involvement in other agricultural or non-farm activities are excluded as a rule so 
the survey results are likely to understate both the prevalence of pluriactivity and the 
importance of non-farm income sources.  
The survey is conducted on an accounting year basis with a typical year-end in early 
March so FAS 2002/03 centres on the 2002 production and subsidy year.  Accounts for 429 
farms were collected in 2002/03, but the effective sample size is reduced to 376 once farms 
directly affected by the FMD outbreak are excluded from the analysis.2  Data was collected 
on a wide range of physical and financial variables, including crop areas, livestock numbers, 
quotas, production, sales, revenues, subsidies and costs, which allows for the detailed 
identification of policy transfers as well as of farm income, together with information on 
other sources of income recorded by income class.  The data is weighted by size and type 
                                                 
2. SEERAD (2004) notes that the resultant sub-sample is still sufficient “to give a 
representative picture of full-time Scottish farm businesses”. 
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according to the number of farms enumerated in the June 2002 Agricultural Census, to yield 
summary statistics for the population of full-time farms.  With 14708 farms in the sampling 
frame, the sampling fraction for each size and type is 2.6 per cent on average. 
 
3.3 Definition and derivation of variables  
The first issue relates to the identification of the agricultural community which is a 
notoriously poorly defined concept (Hill, 1990).  In the case of Italy, the information 
available allows us to work with three different definitions of the agricultural community that 
are commonly used in the literature.  The most inclusive is based on the total population of 
holdings, defined as the set of all farms of at least 1 hectare plus those of less than 1 hectare 
producing more than a specified amount of output (at least 2066 Euro in the case of Italy) or 
marketing a certain proportion of their output.  This is the field of observation covered in the 
General Census of Agriculture and corresponds both with the universe as defined by FADN 
and the definition of 'agriculture' as an industry in the National Accounts framework.  This 
universe will encompass some holdings that are operated by corporate entities using hired 
managers and workers exclusively.  A second more restrictive definition includes only 
holdings operated by individuals or households, whether with or without the employment of 
additional hired labour.  This corresponds to the broad definition of the agricultural 
household institutional sector as employed in the Total Income of Agricultural Households 
methodology (Eurostat, 1995) and may be further restricted to include only holdings operated 
by households that gain the major part of their income from agriculture.  Finally, the universe 
includes both commercial and non-commercial holdings where the former are defined by 
FADN to be farms that are “large enough to provide a main activity for the farmer and a level 
of income sufficient to support his or her family”. A third definition therefore is limited to 
those holdings that can be classified as commercial in the sense of exceeding a minimum 
economic size, which in the case of Italy in 2002 was set by FADN at 4 ESU.  For Scotland, 
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the limited information available restricts the analysis to this third commercial definition of 
agriculture, for which the threshold size was fixed at 16 ESU in 2002, within which may be 
identified a sub-set of farms operated by individuals or households. 
The second question concerns the definition of post-transfer income.  For Italy, the 
information allows us to consider concepts of both farm income and total household income. 
(Post-transfer) farm income is measured by cash income, which represents the cash return to 
the group with an entrepreneurial interest in the farm, which typically will consist only of 
members of the household,3 for their manual and managerial labour and on all their 
investment in the business.  Being the difference between total receipts and total expenditure, 
this measure is seen to correspond closely to the income position as perceived by the farm 
household (see, for example, Department of the Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), 2002) and to be broadly comparable with other non-farm sources of income.  
(Post-transfer) total household income is equal to the sum of farm income and non-farm 
incomes, including income from other gainful activities, pensions, social security and other 
payments.  Using information on the total number of household members further allows the 
measurement of household income on a per-capita basis.  This measure may be more 
appropriate for an analysis of the impact of agricultural policy on the welfare of the 
agricultural community.  For Scotland, cash income as recorded in FAS must be 
supplemented by wages paid to family workers, which are separately identified, to yield a 
comparable measure of farm income.  FAS also records non-farm income sources, but of the 
farmer and spouse only, leading to a total income measure which can serve as a lower-bound 
estimate of household income that will be exact if there are no other household members that 
                                                 
3  Household and non-household members of the entrepreneurial group are not separately 
identified in the REA survey; however numbers of the latter are likely to be negligible.  In 
the case of Scotland, 97% of farms in the FAS sample operate as sole traders and 
partnerships, of which only 1% include non-family members. 
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have non-farm sources of income.  A per capita measure is also workable using information 
on the number of household members actively involved in the management or operation of 
the farm business. 
Pre-transfer income is simply defined as post-transfer (farm, total household or per 
capita) income, less the net value of transfers due to the provision of support, where the latter 
is assumed equal to that part of gross support which accrues to farm occupiers as owners of 
factors of agricultural production.  Three types of support are identified in the analysis.  First, 
to calculate the impact of market price support on the value of farm output and the cost of 
purchased feed and seed inputs, estimates of the gap between domestic market and border 
prices for agricultural commodities, measured at the farm gate level, are taken from OECD 
(2005) and Rapanà (2006).  As the available data on Tuscany refer only to broad categories 
of output, namely crops, livestock and livestock products, weighted estimates of market price 
support by output category are constructed for this purpose using FADN data on the average 
composition of farm output by farm type and region.4  Second, direct support payments cover 
those payments made under CAP ‘Pillar I’ commodity schemes, after taking account of the 
implicit loss in revenues resulting from obligatory set-aside requirements under the Arable 
Area Payment scheme.  Third, the value of other grants and subsidies includes all other 
payments to farmers except for those in respect of permanent improvements. 
 The net value of this support to farmers will depend on the extent to which it results in 
increased returns to the farm-owned factors of production and hence in increased farm 
incomes.  Following OECD (2003, Part II), the static effect on farm income of a unit increase 
in output revenues, whether due to market price support, output payments or a reduction in 
set-aside requirements, is identified as the combined income share of the farm-owned factors 
                                                 
4   The use of individual farm rather than FADN farm-type average data on output 
composition by output category yields very similar estimates of the main redistributive 
effects in the case of Scotland. 
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of production, while that of a unit increase in direct payments, grants or subsidies to 
individual inputs (i.e. land and breeding livestock) is simply the farm-owned share of those 
inputs.  Estimates of the combined income share of land, labour and capital by farm type are 
derived from the cross-section survey data as the average of the ratio of gross value added to 
output revenue.  Income shares attributable to land and labour are then separately estimated 
from sub-samples containing only those farms with hired labour and rented land respectively, 
to leave a residual share that is assumed to accrue to capital.  Farm-owned shares of factors of 
production are derived for each farm from the sample data.  This approach recognizes that 
farmers may not be the ultimate beneficiaries of farm support programmes, which will also 
reward other suppliers of agricultural inputs including landlords.  Moreover, the effective 
incidence of support is allowed to vary depending on the mix of support measures. 
 
 
4.  Empirical findings 
This section focuses on the results for Tuscany relating to the redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy on the farm incomes of all holdings, and on the total household incomes of 
the broadly defined agricultural household institutional sector.  Comparisons are drawn where 
appropriate with the results from using alternative definitions of post-transfer incomes and 
the agricultural community, and those obtained for Scotland. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The upper panel of Table 1 presents weighted summary statistics on farm incomes by farm 
type for the universe of all farms in Tuscany.  The first column presents the results for all 
farm types and shows that farm income was 10553 euros on average, but that 21% of farms 
recorded losses in spite of the support available.  The main source of support was provided in 
the form of direct payments but market price support was also significant with domestic 
producer prices for most livestock and livestock products well above corresponding world 
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price levels.  Leakages to other owners of factors of production mean that farmers are 
estimated to have received only 65% of the gross value of support on average.  Overall, the 
net value of transfers to farmers was 22% of post-transfer farm incomes, compared to 103% 
in Scotland, reflecting the lower levels of support for Mediterranean products (Tracy, 1998).   
 The remaining columns of the top panel present comparable summary information for 
the eight distinct farm types identified in the FADN General Type classification.  Post-
transfer income levels were highest on specialist granivore and horticulture farms, which are 
typically much larger business enterprises.  Direct payments only provided the main source of 
support on crop farms, but are much more significant as a source of transfers given the lower 
income transfer efficiency of market price support measures.5  Gross support varied across 
types, with the highest levels on specialist granivore farms and the lowest on specialist 
permanent crop farms.  Average transfers to farmers follow a broadly similar pattern but 
differences in transfer efficiency rates lead to a lower degree of variation across farm types.  
Controlling for average levels of post-transfer income, dependency on policy transfers by 
farm type varies inversely with international competitiveness (see IRPET, 2004), being 
particularly low on specialised permanent crop and specialised horticulture farms engaged in 
the production of wine and ornamental plants respectively.  Overall, the dispersion of average 
incomes by farm type was lower for post-transfer incomes than for pre-transfer incomes, 
implying that the provision of support generally served to reduce rather than exacerbate farm 
income disparities between farm types in Tuscany.  This was also the case in Scotland (see 
Allanson, 2006b), though OECD (2003, Part I) reports that the provision of support increases 
average income disparities between farm types in most countries.   
                                                 
5   The average value added share of output revenues is positive for all farm types, ranging 
from 0.44 to 0.70, as is the residual share accruing to the farm-owned factors of 
production on all but a handful of mixed cropping farms that are heavily reliant on both 
hired labour and rented land and for which the residual share is set equal to zero. 
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 The lower panel of Table 1 reports a similar set of summary statistics on total household 
incomes by farm type for the broad definition of the agricultural community.  The first 
column again presents the results for all farm types and shows that average total household 
income was 20003 euros, of which just less than 50% was derived from farming.  Even net of 
the value of policy transfers, less than 2% of farms recorded a negative income.   Total 
household income levels were highest on specialist granivore farms and lowest on mixed 
crops-livestock farms, with the ranking of the farm types by total household income roughly 
the same as that by farm income. In contrast, the ranking of farm types by non-farm income 
is almost the reverse of that by farm income, with specialist granivore and horticulture farms 
particularly dependent on farming as a source of income relative to the much lower levels of 
dependence on non-specialised crop and livestock farms.  Overall, non-farm income sources 
generally served to reduce rather than exacerbate income disparities between farm types in 
Tuscany with the dispersion of total household incomes by farm type slightly lower than that 
of farm incomes.  The picture that emerges of the relationships between farm, non-farm and 
total household incomes is broadly similar to that painted by Hill (1999) from reviews of 
available microeconomic data in a number of countries.  
 Table 2 reports regression summary statistics from the non-parametric estimation of the 
transfer functions, together with comparable results from the linear regression of transfers on 
pre-transfers incomes.  The first point to note is that the predictive power of the non-
discriminatory transfer function, defined as the square of the correlation coefficient between 
the fitted and observed values (see Zheng and Agresti, 2000), is superior to that of the linear 
model for all definitions of the agricultural community and measures of income.  Pre-transfer 
income is highly significant in the linear model, but the assumption of linearity can generally 
be rejected in favour of the non-discriminatory function using an appropriate F test procedure 
(Cleveland and Devlin, 1988, p.599).  Second the predictive power of the set of farm type 
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functions is superior to that of the non-discriminatory function in all cases.  The set of 
restrictions implicit in the pooled non-discriminatory function are consistently rejected, 
implying that farm type had a significant influence on the level of transfers conditional on 
pre-transfer income.  Third, the predictive power of the non-parametric models is higher 
using the farm rather than the household concept of income, which is not unexpected in the 
absence of any direct link between transfers and non-farm incomes.  
 Table 3 presents the main findings of the study for Tuscany.  The first column provides 
the results on the redistributive effects of agricultural policy on farm incomes for the universe 
of all farms.  Absolute inequality in post-transfer farm incomes is shown to have been 
substantial, implying that the average absolute income differential between farms was nearly 
double average income.  In comparison, the distribution of pre-transfer income exhibited 
somewhat lower levels of absolute inequality.  The provision of support thus increased 
absolute income differentials as indicated by the negative values of the index of net 
redistributive effect R which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  Overall, 
agricultural policy increased average farm income disparities by 15 per cent.  
 The decomposition of R reveals three main points of interest.  First, the distribution of 
non-discriminatory transfers was regressive in absolute terms, as indicated by the negative 
values of the vertical redistribution and disparity indices, V and D.  By implication, farmers 
with high pre-transfer incomes received a more than equal share of non-discriminatory 
transfers, which is consistent with the findings reported in Rocchi et al. (2005) for Italy as a 
whole.  Second, the redistributive impact of the regressive distribution of non-discriminatory 
transfers was reinforced by the combined effect of the various sources of horizontal inequity, 
as measured by the sum of the indices HR, HB and HW.  Third, the redistributive effect of 
within farm type HI was the dominant source of horizontal inequities, with neither the 
estimate of between type HI nor that of the systematic reranking effect significantly different 
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from zero at the 5% level.  By implication, the main factor underlying horizontal inequities 
was the stochastic nature of the relationship between transfers and pre-transfer incomes at the 
farm type level, rather than systematic discrimination between farm types due to the 
commodity organisation of agricultural support or systematic re-ranking due to the presence 
of income traps in the non-discriminatory benefit schedule. 
 The second column gives results on the redistributive effects of agricultural policy on 
farm incomes for commercial farms only.  By definition commercial farms are of above 
average economic size and exhibit correspondingly higher average post-transfer incomes than 
the universe of all farms.  Higher average income disparities also emerge due to the 
elimination of the mass of small non-commercial farms with similar income levels to each 
other.  Moreover, the negative redistributive impact of policy is greater for two reasons.  First 
the magnitude of V increases because the higher average value of transfers to commercial 
farms leads to an increase in Bt  which is only partly offset by the resultant decrease in the 
disparity index D.  Second within HI is higher because the conditional absolute variation in 
transfer levels is increasing in pre-transfer incomes.   
Comparable results to column 2 are given in the first column of Table 4 for the 
commercial farm sector in Scotland.  Commercial farms in Scotland must be larger than 16 
ESU so it is not surprising that average income and transfer levels are higher and that the size 
of the absolute redistributive effects is correspondingly greater.  What stands out in contrast 
to the Tuscan results is the finding that agricultural support in Scotland was progressive not 
regressive in absolute terms.  However this finding does not indicate that the nature of the 
support provision in Scotland was fundamentally different, with transfers roughly 
proportional to the volume of production in both regions (cf. European Commission, 1991).  
Rather it reflects the fact that the majority of Scottish farms were engaged in enterprises that 
were loss-making but for the provision of support, such that transfers in Scotland were 
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negatively not positively correlated with pre-transfer incomes (see Allanson, 2006b).  In 
general, the vertical stance of agricultural policy in a region may be expected to reflect the 
degree of dependency of the region’s agriculture on support, with Tuscany and Scotland 
towards opposite ends of the spectrum within the European Union (see Zanias, 2002, Table 1; 
European Commission, 2001, Map 5.6). 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 give the results for Tuscany on the redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy on farm and total household incomes for farms run by individuals and 
households, that is for the broadly defined agricultural community.  The first main finding 
that emerges from the two sets of results is the increase in absolute inequality when passing 
from a farm to a household definition of income.  Farm households with low farm incomes 
tend to have higher non-farm incomes than those with higher farm incomes so the distribution 
of non-farm incomes is progressive in absolute terms with respect to farm incomes.  
Nevertheless, taking non-farm incomes into account increases income inequality because of 
differences in the levels of non-farm income earned by households with similar levels of farm 
income (i.e. due to horizontal inequities in the incidence of non-farm incomes).  Second, the 
vertical stance of agricultural policy appears less regressive relative to the distribution of pre-
transfer income when using the total household definition of income.  This is due to the re-
ranking of households in the pre-transfer distribution when non-farm incomes are taken into 
account, leading to a reduction in the negativity of the disparity index D as farm-income poor 
households with low policy transfers move up the distribution at the expense of those with 
higher transfers.  Third, the use of the total household income concept leads to an increase in 
measured within HI, as might be expected given that the provision of agricultural support is 
contingent on factors that are not directly related to non-farm incomes.  In contrast, the likely 
effect on between HI is more ambiguous depending on the nature of any biases in agricultural 
policy relative to the non-farm income potential of households by farm type.  And the impact 
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on the systematic reranking effect is likely to be small unless the relationship between non-
farm and farm incomes is highly non-monotonic (see Hill, 1999, for a summary of evidence 
on this point).   
Columns 5 of Table 3 also presents results for the broad agricultural community, but 
with total income measured in per capita terms  to accord with the concern for ‘the individual 
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture’ expressed in the founding objectives of the CAP.  
The average number of household members is 1.77, so income levels, absolute income 
inequality and absolute redistributive effects are all understandably smaller when measured 
on an individual rather than a household basis.  The distribution of transfer is also less 
regressive, as shown by the smaller negative value of the disparity index, reflecting the 
positive association between household income and household size that is observed in 
Tuscany (see Lam, 1997).  Interpreting the income per capita results in welfare terms 
(Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000), annual transfers per household member could have been 
cut by €612 with no effect on welfare if it had been possible to devise a distributionally 
neutral policy regime, or by roughly half the average per capita transfer observed in practice. 
Column 6 of Table 3 gives the results on the redistributive effects of agricultural policy 
on total household incomes for the narrow rather than the broad definition of the agricultural 
community.  Limiting the size of the community in this way leads to an increase in both the 
average economic size of farms and total household incomes.  Moreover, the nature of the 
threshold criterion leads to an increase in income disparities due to the elimination of the 
mass of households with low farm incomes but high non-farm incomes.  Finally, the negative 
redistributive impact of policy R is also greater, both because V is more negative as the higher 
average level of transfers Bt  to farms more dependent on farming as a source of income is 
only partially offset by the resultant decrease in the disparity index D, and because of the 
increase in within HI due to the higher dispersion in transfer levels on farms with higher pre-
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transfer incomes.  These findings mirror those obtained from the comparison between all and 
commercial farms on the basis of farm incomes. 
Finally, columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 4 give results for Scotland on the redistributive 
effects of agricultural policy on farm, total household and per capita household incomes for 
commercial farms run by individuals and households.  These results must be treated with 
some caution given the limitations of the data both on total income and household size.  
Nevertheless the main findings that emerge when passing from a farm to a household 
definition of income are similar to those for Tuscany.  First, the distribution of household 
incomes would have been less unequal than that of farm incomes if it had not been for the 
adverse consequences of horizontal inequities in the incidence of non-farm incomes.  Second, 
the vertical stance of agricultural policy appears more progressive relative to the distribution 
of pre-transfer income when using the total household definition of income due to the re-
ranking of households in the pre-transfer distribution when non-farm incomes are taken into 
account.  Third, the use of the total household income concept leads to an increase in 
measured within HI, reflecting the inherent limitations of agricultural support as a means to 
improve the overall welfare of the farming community.  However, the distribution of 
transfers is somewhat less progressive when household income is measured on a per capita 
basis in spite of a similar positive association between household size and total income. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this paper has been to explore the robustness of estimates of the 
redistributive effects of agricultural policy to the use of alternative measures of income and 
definitions of the agricultural community.  The European Commission has for many years 
expressed concerns about the inequitable distribution of farm income support (European 
Commission 1991, 1997, 2002) and in the recent Mid Term Review of Agenda 2000 made 
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various proposals to improve the targeting of direct support payments (European Commission 
2002, 2003).  The decoupling of most direct payments from production can only increase the 
extent to which the purpose and distribution of support will be subject to question in the future.  
The methodology employed in the paper is based on the use of population-weighted 
micro-level data to evaluate changes in the distribution of income within the agricultural 
community due to the provision of support.  More specifically, the overall redistributive 
effect of agricultural policy is measured as the difference between the absolute Gini indices 
of pre-transfer and post-transfer incomes.  This is a measure of the change in absolute 
inequality, which provides a benchmark of distributional neutrality more in accord with both 
public and official perceptions of fairness in the distribution of farm support than one based 
on the concept of relative inequality.  The measure may be interpreted as the monetary value 
per farm of the change in inequality due to the provision of support.  Moreover it may be 
decomposed into a vertical redistribution effect and various HI components, and thus serves 
not only to quantify but also to characterise the redistributive effect of agricultural policy. 
The main set of empirical results presented in the paper are based on an analysis using 
individual farm records for 2002 from the Italian Agricultural Business Survey (REA) of 
Tuscany.  These show that the provision of support increased absolute income inequality 
within the agricultural community because the distribution of transfers was both vertically 
and horizontally inequitable.  The regressive incidence of transfers implies that farms with 
higher pre-transfer incomes also tended to receive larger policy transfers, consistent with the 
general perception that the bulk of agricultural support goes to those that do not need it 
(OECD, 2003).  Horizontal inequities largely arose due to the stochastic nature of the 
relationship between transfers and pre-transfer incomes at the farm type level, rather than 
because of either systematic discrimination between farm types due to the commodity 
organisation of support or systematic reranking as a result of income traps in the transfer 
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schedule.  The variation in the value of transfers received by farms of the same type with 
similar pre-transfer incomes points to the imperfect targeting of support under the CAP (see 
Allanson, 2006b, for further discussion). 
The paper demonstrates that these findings concerning the redistributive properties of the 
CAP are robust to the specification of alternative measures of income and definitions of the 
agricultural community.  First, moving from a farm to a total household measure of income 
tends to exacerbate post-transfer income differentials, but reduce the negative redistributive 
effects of agricultural policy as the regressivity of transfers is somewhat moderated by the re-
ranking of farms in the pre-transfer income distribution when non-farm incomes are taken 
into account.  Expressing total incomes in per-capita terms, that is on an individual rather 
than a household basis, leads to a further slight reduction in the regressivity of transfers due 
to the positive association between household income and size.  Nevertheless the increase in 
income differentials due to the provision of support remains substantial relative to the 
average level of both transfers and post-transfer incomes.  Second, moving from less to more 
inclusive definitions of the agricultural community, by relaxing the thresholds on the size of 
holding or dependence on farming income, tends to decrease post-transfer income 
differentials due to the inclusion of a mass of smaller holdings with low incomes.  The 
redistributive effect of agricultural policy also falls as the impact of lower average transfers is 
only partially offset by resultant increases in transfer regressivity, but remains negative.   
Additionally, the paper shows that to the extent that it is possible to generate comparable 
results for Scotland using Farm Accounts Survey data, then these tend to confirm the Tuscan 
findings in spite of the marked differences in both agricultural structures and average support 
levels between the two regions.  Indeed, the only substantive difference in the results is the 
finding that the distribution of transfers is progressive not regressive in Scotland as a result of 
the chronic dependence of Scottish agriculture on support.  The broad concordance in the 
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results suggests that the findings of the study may be more generally characteristic of the 
redistributive properties of the CAP throughout the European Union, with the vertical stance 
of agricultural policy in a region primarily determined by the degree of dependency of the 
region’s agriculture on the provision of support.  
Nevertheless the analysis is still confined within the agricultural household institutional 
sector, that is the subset of households for which farming is a source of income (whether 
primary or not). A fuller analysis would require a sample on the whole of the household 
sector, with the possibility to identify agricultural policy transfers both to households within 
the agricultural community and from those in other sections of society.  Only then will it be 
possible to definitively assess the extent to which agricultural policy is capable of both 
identifying remaining low income problems among agricultural households and ensuring the 
equitable treatment of the agricultural community in relation to the rest of society.  
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Table 1. Weighted Summary Statistics by Farm Type,  Tuscany 
 General Type of Farming (FADN class) 
Average per farm All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Farm Income. Universe of all farms 
Number of observations 643 139 77 234 40 24 95 11 23
% of raised sample   18.5% 2.8% 45.2% 6.7% 0.2% 18.6% 2.4% 5.7%
Farm business size (ESU) 11 18 43 9 8 48 8 9 7
Post-transfer income (€) 10553 11187 20853 12128 9900 60541 5575 8707 6962
Proportion of  farms <0 21.2% 25.7% 9.0% 23.0% 21.6% 3.1% 21.4% 0.3% 7.3%
Gross support (€) 3503 5383 6265 1742 6466 9334 2997 7273 6467
Of which due to:-    
Market price support 1309 282 2410 872 4495 8277 864 4498 3727
Direct support payments 1527 4504 384 304 1847 585 1311 2592 2071
Other grants and subsidies 668 597 3471 565 124 472 822 184 670
Transfers to farmers (€) 2283 4321 2177 1015 4535 5816 1741 4517 3882
Of which due to:-    
Market price support 665 84 1029 428 3070 4369 315 2448 1714
Direct support payments 1261 3891 282 271 1393 1188 973 1898 1598
Other grants and subsidies 357 347 866 317 72 259 453 171 570
As % of post-transfer income 21.6% 38.6% 10.4% 8.4% 45.8% 9.6% 31.2% 51.9% 55.8%
Pre-transfer income (€)  8270 6865 18676 11112 5365 54725 3833 4191 3080
Proportion of farms <0 24.9% 31.1% 9.9% 25.8% 28.3% 6.9% 17.4% 68.1% 9.0%
Total Household  Income. ‘Broad’ definition of agricultural community 
Number of observations 569 124 75 197 38 22 81 10 22
% of raised sample   18.8% 2.9% 45.4% 6.0% 0.2% 18.5% 2.4% 5.8%
Farm business size (ESU) 10 18 43 9 8 48 8 9 7
Post-transfer income (€) 20003 20827 25972 20919 20708 47030 17080 24571 13056
Of which:   Farm income 9633 10600 20782 10242 11222 39465 5425 9975 6895
Non-farm income 10370 10227 5190 10677 9485 7565 11654 14596 6160
Proportion of  farms <0 1.1% 0.8% 5.8% 0.5% 0.2% 3.2% 0.8% 0.0% 7.3%
Gross support (€) 3131 4808 6273 1281 7393 9571 2499 7090 6380
Of which due to:-    
Market price support 1171 281 2408 597 5131 8408 715 4479 3673
Direct support payments 1385 4055 385 225 2121 673 1110 2427 2036
Other grants and subsidies 575 473 3480 460 142 490 674 184 670
Transfers to farmers (€) 2127 3879 2184 815 5292 5466 1659 4457 3841
Of which due to:-    
Market price support 644 85 1025 338 3595 3849 335 2537 1709
Direct support payments 1151 3519 282 189 1614 1381 884 1748 1562
Other grants and subsidies 332 274 876 288 82 236 440 172 571
Pre-transfer income (€)  17876 16948 23789 20104 15416 41564 15420 20114 9214
Proportion of farms <0 1.5% 0.9% 5.8% 0.7% 3.8% 3.2% 0.8% 0.0% 9.0%
Source: Own calculations using REA data.  FADN Classes. 1 – Specialist field crops.                      
2 – Specialist horticulture. 3 – Specialist permanent crops.  4 – Specialist grazing livestock.     
5 – Specialist granivores.  6 – Mixed crops.  7 – Mixed livestock.  8 – Mixed crops-livestock.     
 28
Table 2. Summary statistics from transfer function regressions 
Field of coverage All Cmrcl Broad Broad Broad Narrow
Income measure Farm Farm Farm Hhld Hhld/hd Hhld
Predictive power of:   
Linear regression model 0.134 0.122 0.070 0.064 0.054 0.058
Non-discriminatory function fB(x) 0.256 0.211 0.217 0.155 0.120 0.162
Set of farm type specific functions fk(x) 0.372 0.334 0.392 0.279 0.315 0.308
   
F test of:   
Pre-transfer income effect  98.85 78.66 42.36 38.56 20.11 35.17
in linear model 6.67 6.68 6.68 6.68 6.71 6.68
Linearity in non-discriminatory function  17.89 16.80 28.43 18.39 8.62 23.40
 6.72 8.91 10.07 16.79 8.77 20.04
Farm type effects in farm type functions 4.00 3.60 5.49 3.54 3.67 4.41
 2.58 2.31 2.57 3.28 2.45 3.06
Critical values of the F statistics at the 1% significance level are reported in italics.  
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Table 3.  Redistributive effects of agricultural support policy, Tuscany.  
Field of coverage All Cmrcl Broad Broad Broad Narrow
Income measure Farm Farm Farm Hhld Hhld/hd Hhld
Number of observations n 643 567 569 569 569 357
Population 83459 34075 81463 81463 144134 20313
Average post-transfer income (€) y 10553 24455 9633 20003 11306 38060
 1253 2456 1140 1314 712 3756
Of which:   Farm income 10553 24455 9633 9633 5444 34919
 1253 2456 1140 1211 633 3675
 Non-farm income - - - 10370 5861 3141
 - - - 584 349 394
Average gross support (€) 3503 8115 3131 3131 1770 10096
 357 713 355 352 192 1101
Average transfers to farmers (€) t 2283 5378 2127 2127 1202 6986
 233 470 238 236 132 758
Average pre-transfer income (€) z 8270 19077 7506 17876 10103 31075
 1105 2218 989 1175 639 3380
Absolute Gini index of  AY 10049 20574 8678 10142 5485 24767
post-transfer income 1112 2037 979 1007 519 2752
Absolute Gini index of  AW 9662 19579 8317 9627 5171 23445
farm type specific reference income 1100 2029 967 995 512 2750
Absolute Gini index of  AB 9652 19700 8364 9751 5131 23257
non-discriminatory reference income 1104 2033 974 999 515 2763
Absolute concentration index of  By CB 9652 19700 8364 9751 5131 23242
non-discriminatory reference income 1104 2034 973 999 515 2762
Absolute Gini index of  AX 8614 18105 7251 8990 4873 21682
pre-transfer income 1030 1950 894 929 482 2677
Index of redistributive effect R -1434 -2469 -1426 -1151 -612 -3084
 165 314 170 159 90 403
Index of vertical redistribution V -1037 -1595 -1113 -761 -259 -1559
    171 317 173 162 96 448
Disparity of net transfers D -0.466 -0.291 -0.526 -0.352 -0.315 -0.278
 0.058 0.050 0.055 0.061 0.062 0.057
Av. non-discriminatory transfers Bt 2283 5378 2127 2127 1202 6986
239 478 238 256 158 785
Index of systematic reranking HR 0 0 0 0 0 -16
21 22 22 3 1 91
Between farm type classical HI HB -10 121 48 125 -39 -188
 87 161 81 93 57 253
Within farm type classical HI HW -387 -995 -361 -515 -314 -1321
 69 140 62 91 53 202
Source: Own calculations using REA data.  All measures are calculated using the population-
weighted data.  Absolute Gini and concentration indices are estimated using the formulae in 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1989) for weighted samples.  Bootstrap standard errors, based on 1000 
replications, are reported in italics and reflect not only the inherent sampling variability of the 
measures given the stratified nature of the sample, but also the uncertainty about the exact values 
of non-farm income.  
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Table 4.  Redistributive effects of agricultural support policy, Scotland. 
Field of coverage All cmrcl Broad cmrcl Broad cmrcl Broad cmrcl
Income measure Farm Farm Hhld Hhld/hd
Number of observations n 354 336 336 336
Population 13277 13069 13069 25093
Average post-transfer income (€) y 49455 49310 65434 34078
 1865 1927 2209 1352
Of which:   Farm income 49455 49310 49310 25681
 1865 1927 1992 1180
 Non-farm income - - 16123 8397
 - - 1399 761
Average gross support (€) 81594 81272 81272 42327
 1561 1523 1594 1213
Average transfers to farmers (€) t 51110 51028 51028 26576
 1184 1186 1220 772
Average pre-transfer income (€) z -1655 -1718 14405 7502
 1416 1390 1869 991
Absolute Gini index of  AY 23496 23432 24077 13105
post-transfer income 1160 1169 1187 643
Absolute Gini index of  AW 16235 16526 16979 9497
farm type specific reference income 1196 1234 1260 738
Absolute Gini index of  AB 13692 13388 15097 8554
non-discriminatory reference income 2057 2131 2180 1289
Absolute concentration index of  By CB 13253 13023 14837 8016
non-discriminatory reference income 2062 2150 2180 1291
Absolute Gini index of  AX 18762 18760 21195 11268
pre-transfer income 1039 1097 1153 660
Index of redistributive effect R -4733 -4672 -2882 -1838
 1067 1081 1167 590
Index of vertical redistribution V 5510 5737 6358 3251
    1305 1340 1319 806
Disparity of net transfers D 0.096 0.103 0.127 0.113
 0.025 0.025 0.019 0.022
Av. non-discriminatory transfers Bt 51110 51028 51028 26576
 1905 1995 2228 1447
Index of systematic reranking HR -439 -365 -260 -537
148 168 41 20
Between farm type classical HI HB -2543 -3138 -1882 -943
 1329 1365 1420 827
Within farm type classical HI HW -7261 -6906 -7098 -3609
 613 610 669 359
Source: Own calculations using FAS data.  The difference in sample size between the first and 
other columns is partly due to the dropping of a number of observations with incomplete records 
on non-farm incomes.  See also the notes to Table 3.   
 
  
 
